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ABSTRACT
I The arqcle review~ the present state of technology management in our liberalised environment. For our
industries, technology management is mainly technology importand for our scientists it is management of R&D.
The changes introduced in technology management by the intense competitive environment are discussed and
the ~ffects of the broadened scope for technology management for sustained competitiveness are brought out.
Technology fusion and :core competence as part of the strategic framework follow as a response to the
environment. The Indian ~cenario is now discussed in the light of these developments. The paper concludes that
all JXlrties involved in technology management namely, government, industrie'P and the scientistslt~hnologists
have to recognise these changes and act in a concerted manner for the nation to gain and sustain the competitive
edge. .
1
technology import in~tead of tecynology management is
in complete contrast to the attitude of industries in
developed countries where technology management is a
crucial element of competitive ad~antage. The focus of
management in these countries is' on the understanding
and resolving of the complexities added to decision
making due to high rate of technological change,
technology deployment, ability of competitors and new
comers to catch up with leaders in short time, strategic
planning upstream, and restructuring of the organisation
including the R&~ to make it more responsive to
market forces.
I. INTRODUtTlqN
There is no gaillsaying of the fact that increased
profit~ and enhanced exports have/created in Indian
indust,rt, a sense of optimism and greater confidence to
overcome the proplems envisaged earlier due to
liberalisation of tra~e and industrial policy by the
Government. The improved performance can be
attributed mostly to ~he availability of inexpensive
capital and in a smallerl measure to improved labourI ,
productivbty. It is clear from the various
pronoun~e~ents made by the heads of indu~triTs that
industry in th~ private sector is al?d will be spending
resources on technology imp~rts for improving
productiyity.It is also a ~atter of lecord that repetitive
imports Are on the rise. These re-inforce the belief that
industry ha~ interpreted ,the catch-up process through
technology J\1anagement as exercising t~e 'buy' option
withput a commitment to ~trengthen a 'make' option for
the (utur~ through in-house or indigenous R&D. This
has evoked a response from the Prime Minister bf IndiaI
who in his address,to the 82nd s~ssion of .the Indian
Science ~ongress h~s urged the industry to look beyond
factors like capital and labour and confirm the
I
importancc of:technology development as a determinant
of economic growth. The tilt of our industries to
,I --
2. PREREQUISITES FOR TECHNOLOGY
CATCH-UP
According to most economists, the key elements in
the process of catch-up in economic growth ar.e:
investment in physical capital, availability of educated
and trained manp0Wer and general management
capabilitiesl. This is based on the simplistic assumption
that the pr.ocess ofl technology import gets reduced to
technology transfer which is costless. It is unrealistic
because technology is more than a set of discrete
tcchniques each of which can be completely codified
and contained in a ;book of blueprints', material inputs
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and the physical means for accomplishment. Further,
many case studies of technology imports from
developed to developing economies have revealed that
the tacit component of knowledge about technology can
only be acquired through investment in learning which
is grounded in purposeful analysis of information
gained through practical experience, and is vested in the
R&D institutional infrastructure ,set up for the creation
and utilisation of technology. Such investments in
learning lead to assimilation, duplicating understanding
that exist without adding to the stock of existing
knowledge, to invention and inl?ovation, creating new
elements of reproducible technology that yield equal or
higher productiv'ity under local <;onditions2.
Technological investment has two components,
namely, the degree of external participation and the
internal technological capability acquired through
,
previous investment in technology. Management of
technological advancement, therefore, involves choice
of changes to be made and the investments to be
undertaken for bridging the technology gap. The
imported technology has to be checked for
circumstantial differences and for sensit~vity to
circumstantial differences. Circumstantial differences
cover physical economic and social differences such as
material input characteristics, climatic conditions,
income levels, coqsumer preferences, factor costs, etc.,
between developed and developing nations. Important
f
proof of circumstantial differences can be evidenced
I
from engineering activities that occur when new
,
production facilities are being ~stablished. For example,
in the case of natural resource-intensive products such
as steel and cemeft, in several instances the imported
technology had tc;> be suitably adapted to accept the
locale-specific peculiarities in the raw material
characteristics. In general, if the circumstantial
differences between the countries are small and if the
sensitivity gradient is small, little adaptation would be
necessary and can be carried out by production
engineers without formalised R&D. Howevel:, as the
gap betwe~n a developing and a developed cot1ntry is
grea,ter, major, intense adaptation would be needed
because the knowledge that underlies the technique is
crucial to bring forth offsprings suited to local needs3.
This intense adaptation requirrs formalised R&D
capabilities. I
3. TECHNOLOGy CATCH-pP
In many respects, the fechnology catch-up processI
followed by us is tHat expected of a developing nation
,
with strong educational/training ba~e, low levels of
productivity and export trade orientation. At the level
of the firm, productivity growth i~ being acceleratedI
with the import of technology from the more
advanced economies. Analysis of, the technology
catch-up process by devel~ping countries reveals
that products or processes of Itechnology imports are
, .
mostJy .those which have reached the maturity ph~se of
the life cycle. In sucp cases only minor adaptation is
adequate since the process of product stabilis~tion
and production optimjsation has already been
accomplished. Again, fro~ the study, of the NIEs
(newly industrialised ecorlomies) it cah be reasonably
concluded that this is only the initial ~tage of the
catch-up process,'from which it would be ih1portant for
the country to ~ove out once the wages rise due to
in9reased expectations. Then, Indian! industries can no
longerldepend on inexpensive labour for rssembly-type
mrtss productioA industries4. Additionally, there will be
increasing competitiorijfrom other low-wage
countries who wJII be following a similar route for
,
economic expansion. Finally, silnce the competitiveness
,
of the labour-intensive a~sembly manufacturing
operations is also based on the avai'ability of
production equipment and upstream compo~ents from
the collaborators, the latter mtly use their oligopolistic
status over the input of com~onents to slow down
and limit the expansion of Indian comp,anies to
thwart serious competition in their markets~
After a few year, India too will be forced to follow
suit but before wd do so, industry has to strengthen its
I
in-house R&D tb be capable of undertaking intense
adaptation as Il.-1ell as increm~ntal innovations to
improve the scope for graftipg an outside trar sPlant and
to keep the cost~ , down. At thJ nationa level, the
innovation strategy for sustaining competi~veness will
have to be a mix of in-house R&I:) of the industry.
I
indigenous R&D at acade~ic, govefnment and
cooperative R&D institutions and technology imports.
A number of factors such as the nature of R&D, the
.,
degree of risk aversion, availability of foreign
technqlogy, mode of rechnology transfer, the
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institutional framework for adaptation and the extent of
support given by the government to high-~isk projects
will influence the dec.isions. A thorough understanding
of the mechanism \Jy which technology advances, the
I
nature of technology a!ld product life cycles, the nature
of R&D activities and strategies for creation/sustenance
of competitive advantage are necessary for managers of
j
techn~logy ~o establish an appropriate balance.
4. PATTERN OF TECHNOLOGY
!DVANCEMENT I
From available empirical evidence, it is clear that
I
the basic tr~nds in techno:logy progression are
determined by periodic appearance of innovations as a
result of rational human decislons based on costs and
,
ben6fits. The innovations signify a variety of new
dep+rtures in competition with prevailing practices.
Sinte economists have aQcepted technical change as a
fundamental drivi~ force of productivity growth, the
study of the occurrence of and the events leading to
inndvation assume importance. Schumpeter was the
first I economist to suggest that technological
innovations manifest as uneven discontinuous
,
phenomena, which result in a series of jumps and in
wholesale shift iJ technology and in ~he knowledgej
base. He also stated/ that innovations tend to cluster
because; first a few and then most firms follow in the
wake o~ the successful innovatipn. The organisation
culture that subsequently developed iJ the West
emphasised Jtechnology breakthroughs, the ~old idea
and the brilliant concept to ~ave an unassailabl~
compe,titive advantage. All altetnate manifestation of
innovations emphasise!d the continuous nature of
innovations and stressed that sy stematic continuin g\ I
improvements alone I can overcome the teething
problems in the case :of radical new products and
prbcesses. These improvements would continue
throughout the lif~ of the product sa that a, coh1bination
of learning by doing and learning by usi.ng Ican yield
strong prQductiv~ty gains for a considerable period.
.This gained prokinence in the West only after the
Japanese turned it iAto a powerful tool to create andI
sustain the competitive edge in such fields as consumer
,
electronics" I semiconductors, robotics, fibre optic
communicatiqn and automobilesS-8.
In general, radical innovati~ns are large and
,
discrete ch~nges in technology in which new ideas
without precedent e,merge I more or less ab nihi/o,
occasionally. They are followed by incremental
innovations which are small cumulati,ve gains that
improve, adapt and streamline the processes andI
products to minimise costs, enhance performance,
increase reliability and reduce the input requirements.
The radical and the incremental innovations are
complementary. A satisfactory theory of innovations
t~erefore must include the radical innovations, and the
innumerable incremental improvements that follow.
Radical innovations involve structural changes in
economy and ultimately lead to entirely new
applications and to new branches of industry. These are
the main sources of dynamic development; by definition
they need quite new skills and in many cases a different
management organisation and production equipments.I
Incremental innovations oonlribute to the economic
success of the radical innovation and the range of
improvements that can be carried out are substantial.
However, these would ultirhately be limited by the
constraints of that particular tethnology.
ITechnology advancement has been observed to
follow preferential paths Iknown as technology
trajectories. In a limited sense, the edifice of technology
in an industrialised society can be compared to ajigsaw
puzzle with the pieces corresponding to established
technologies fitting in an intricate and precise manner.
This edifice is ever changing and expanding. The
changes in the edifice of technology are brought about
firstly, to counter the threat of new technology that is
entering and secondly to meet the felt needs of society.
The expansion of the technology edifice comes about
from those new technologies which find a range of new
applications which could not be had with earlier
technologies and thus provide ~he necessary trigger for
expansion of societal needs. Antibiotics and integrated
circuits are typical examples of such new technologies.
New technologies however, do int?t replace the older
technologies in till their spheres of applications. For
example, in the case of integrated circuits, they could
replace vacuum tubes and discrete semiconductor
devices in all but medium and high power applications.
Thus, new technologies enter into the corpus of existing
technology base only if they can demonstrate attributes
that are superior to established technologies they are
meant to replace and find applications at an early stage.
The success rate of a new technology is not likely to be
high since it cannot function in isolation to in the needs
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of the society, the existing infrastructure and the
prevalent technologies9-11.
Once the new technology has been demonstrated
to perform successfully, thousands of 'helpers' seeking
additional uses come into existence. The aggregate
impact of such additional applications cannot be
normally estimated before. hand. Consequently,
managers of technology are confronted with a
threatening paradox.! They may be right in dismissing
the likely impact of new technology in a large majority
of cases but if they miss the rare event of a new
technQlogy being eminently successful, they are
considered as failures. , Achieving a sound balance,
between continued concentration on established
technologies and divertihg adequate effort to introduce
new te~hnology requires technology managers tOt
understand the technology life cycle (TLC), which is
also the corner-stone for understanding the market
behaviourof the products.
eventual convergence of computing and
telecommunication technologies, only !NEC of Japan
committed its resources to make this con'vergence the
,
central theme of its strategic decisions. Similarly, the
examples of Microsoft, DEC and Apple show us that by
making technology as the focal ~Oirt in their strategy,
they created a competitive advantage by offering unique
products, lowering costs or both: These companies
understopd the role of technology as the mainspring of
differentiation in the market place and used treir'
respective technological expeGtise to offer a different
bundle of products, services and price ranges covering
a wide range ofcustomersl3. I I
Eventually, customer preference settles OIJ one or
a few products out oflthe many and the reward of market
dominance goes to ~hose firms whose products have
been preferred. One way for any firm to achieve
dominancel is to promote its product ~s th~ industry
standarp in reliabili~y and in performance. I~ general,
the dominant design can 'be recognised!from the
following characteristics. Firstl~, the technology and
,
the product 6vercome the present, const~aints of the
existing technology without impo~ing stringent new
,
constraints. Secondly, the design ,. has flexibi~ity to
accommodate and possibly enhance the vatue of
potential innovations in any of its componel1ts or
processes. Further, the product aJd the technology
find applications in new areas. Fi~ally,! the product
makes use of the existing I infrastructure rather) than
replacing it totally right at the beginning.: The
emergence of the dominant desigr triggers the
beginning of the Expaqsion phase. In this phase, the set
of successful compe~itors are likely to become an
oligopoly and the pro,cess of 'survival of the fittest'
stabilises the industry.! Competition begins to shift the
emphasis to price apd mostlly imprpvements and
refinemel'1ts of the dominant products and their clones
take place to meet the growing market nee4s. The
.,
objective in the Expansion Phase is to. improve the
productivity and make product diff~rentiation difficult
so that the innovator with first-to-market advantage can
produce more efficiently and consistently. The stimulus
for innovation arises out of the nlew opportunities
created by the expanding scope of application. The firm
, ,
for its ,survival must have atleast one product which is
stable enough to have significant, production volume.
The effectiveness of the strategy by any of the players
in this game is thus governed by the 'breadth of their
product line, the strength of the distributor network and
, I
5. TECHNOLOGY LIFE CYCLE
Broadly speaking, technology life cycle undergoes
distinct stages of growth and stabilisation before it is
phased out by a hew technology. These are, the
Embryonic, the Expan~ion, the Maturity and the Ageing
stagesl2. In the Embrxonic stage the process is one of
technology pioneering by which the firms create and!
introduce new technologies to the I1jIarket well ahead of
others. It is closely related to radical shifts in a
technology spurred by major scientific advances.j
Pioneering can ,strengthen a firm's competitive
position by increasing its market share, enhance its
reputation and name-recognition and improve its
financial position. It is also a double edged sword
because many pioneers have failed to achieve market
leadership. .For example Xerox, a, pioneer in graphic
interface software, failed to follow it through in market
leadership, leaving it to Microsoft to create apd
commercialise the software. The objective of all
competitors in the Embryonic phase is to keep the
situation in a state of flux by offering a large number of
products and a great variety of services or applications.
For an enterprise. to emerge as a leader at the end of the
1
Embryonic phase, it has to invest heavily from a very
early stage in establishing its technology and later to
achieve economies .of sc~le. This would enable the firm I
to redefine the boundaries of industry and rules of
competition for the reward of market leadership. For
instance, in the 1970s while many firms recognised the
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the slope of improvement reaches its maximum on the
S-curve. Whenever a new technology that is lower in
the S-curve begins replacing an existing technology
which is high up in the S-curve, a technology
discontinuity occurs. So long as the technology life
cycle covered long time periods the effects of
discontinuity were not felt. With high technology,
I however, the. discontinuity effects are 1ikely to be
significant due to shorter period. Technology
discontinuity affects the employees, the production
processes and the organisations engaged in the business.I
Clearly, the crucial task is not only to decide on the
likelihood but also to determine the timing of the
emergence of a candidate new technology as a genuine
tHreat.
Finally, it .has to be noted that even though all
established technologies are ultimately replaced by new
technologies, the success rate of a new technology is
limited due to the complexity of modern societyl5.
6. CONSUMER PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT
,
A technology in the Emqryonic and Expansion
Phases creates many products each of which has a
product life cycle. In ,the case of the consumer products,
the product life cycle is governed mainly by three basicj
parameters, namely, fashion, technology and the
customer needs. Fashion is defined as change for the
sake of change and when produJt changes are effected
to cater to the needs of fashion, tit involves addition of
enhancements, relatively modest technical
improvements, and resolving field-operating problems
to gain advantage over competitors. In general, a typical
product may undergo many improvements and
modifications but it only serves'the same purpose in a
different way. Very often, the short life cycle time
referred to in management studies is likely to generate
wrong impressions of rapidly changing competitive
markets with technology as the differentiator for the
product whereas in reality, it involves relatively minor
br incremental improvementsl A clear distinction
therefore has to be made between the product life cycle
time with technology as the differentiator and the
product, life cy,cle time resulting in minor
improvementl6. The example of sOny's Walkman series
illustrates this asp~ct very well. The same trend persists
in other consumer products such as television receivers,
telephone instruments, washing machines, refrigerator,
etc. As most of these are labour intensive and since the
technology changc~ are cosmetic, they are fit candidates
I
the quality of after-sa\es service. As the Expansion
Pha~e nears its endr p'erformance criteria of each
product is stabilised. The production processes become
further stabilis~d ~nd no c6anges in production
processes are likely tq be undertaken unless it is'mainly
for achieving greater vertical integration. The market
stabilises by the time Maturity Phase is reached and
, .
pressure mounts to reduce costs and improve. quality
further. More and more, the attention of the managers
and the technical personnel' will shift from
improvements I in capability to improvements in
processes for achieving lower cost. The effort to
achieve additional tebhnical advances becomes moreI
difficutt and Ithe improvements are likely to be marginal
and less freqpent. At this stage of the technolegy l:ycle,
both ptoduct and process features are well articulated
and analysed. Therefore, mahufacturing effectiveness
and ptioduction' engineering assJme importance. By the
time the maturity phase is reached halfway, the firmsI
will be ready for technology transfer to expand their
I
market abroad without too muc~ capital.investment. As
the Maturity Phase draws to an dnd, process technology
,
woultl have become more sophisticated and specialised
to c~ter for high volumes with lower per unit profit
margins. Competi,tive Isuccess calls for eff~ctive
management o~ assfts and managers become more
financially oriented.IThe excitement of working in such
a technology is reduced with the result, younger and,
brillia,t minds turn away from this type of work.
The beginning of the Ageing Phase of technology
is marked by a Iprogressive increase in costs for
additional improvements, iDtense dompetition,
customer reluctance to/pay for features and pressures to
reduce pr~ces. Since eve~y technology has a the9retical
upper limtt of performance imposetl by nat~re, as time
passes the probability that a new technology wh~ch has
been alread~ invented, will oyertake the earlier
technology, increases rapidly and becomes certainty.j
Th~ technology life cycle described above follows
the S-pattern with time. While this is the classical
pattern, in specific case~ where the application of an
established ~echnology b~yond the maturation stage has
fou,nd new areas, the lif~ cycle returns to a lower point
in the,S-pattern and its life is. prolonged. I
Therefore if managers can correctly e~tirhate the
onset of mat1;1ration: and subsequent passing to Ageing
Phase, they wou1d be at an enormous advantage
compared to their com~etitors. However, in general, it
is difficult to'know in'advance the point in time when
DEF SCI I, VOL 46, NO 3, JULY 1996
for developing countries to consider first in their drive
for expanding their economy. ,
7. INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT' DEVELOPMENT
In the case of industrial and professional products,
the users place substantially less value on fashion and
hence the change stems from advances in technolqgies
underpinning the product. Thus, in these cases
technology is a critical factor affecting the market
popularity of the product. To arrive at t the
state-of-the-art product, considerable work in relevant
technology areas has to be carried more often without
any specific product in mind. The appearance of
innovations leading to the-st&te-of-the-art product are
thus partly causal and partly serendipitous, because
efforts to advance technology can be focused in
directions that innovators believe to be feasible and
potentially profitable. This type of R&D is more
commonly know" as Exploratory R&D and is defined
as investigation of alternate technologies with the aim
of finding out thei~ natural limits. These investigations
do not have any specific area 0, application or processes
in mind. Market applications for future applications for
the discoveries in Exploratory R&D may be found' after
the work is compfeted and in many cases it may end up
,
in the form of defendable patents. Even if an applicat'ion
is found, the effort to develop it further for specific
application will be limited in this phase of R&D
activity. Exploratory R&D activities are best suited to
the academic environment and hence can be funded at
our advanced academic institutions. The measure of
success is whether it can be further exploited to find an
application in the market place. The decisions ilnvolve
resolution of technology issues related to broad areas of
application. Personal contacts and formal presentations
by the Exploratory R&D to others including
manufacturing personnel will be n~cessary to minimise
the time delays and information gaps. ,
The later part of the activities for the
state-of-the-art product will be directed toJards
utilising the technologies that have been found feasible
for adaptation to perceived market needs. The R&D at
this stage is termed Strategic R&D and is defined as
investigation in science and technology areas worked
upon in the Exploratory ,R&D phase and which are most
likely to be helpful in reaching agreed upon goals of the
nation or the firm. In this case the goal is defined first
in terms of the broad parameters of a product or process
and t~e R&D, activities are then "planned towards
reallsing the goals. T,he Strategic R&D focuses on the
mo.sit promising technologies and applies ther:n to
specific application are~s of interest and for which
broad specifications h~ve been evolved with the
,
participation of marketing and management. At this
stage, the participation. of Short- Term R&D and
manufacturing will be in' the form of proJiding useful/
and necessary irlputs based on their assessment of the
market and to st~er the R&D to arriv~ at solutions that
arJ implementable within the scope of t~e resources of
th~ firm. It alsd helps marketing and mapufacturing to
plan their future activit\es by taking decisions on
additional resources, adequdte processes, raw materials/
or substitutes and so on. In adqition, Short- Term R&D
will carry out trade-off stud~es in design between
various technologies, labour versur capital
requirements, training of personnel etc. De~ending on
the complexity, one or limite4 numbers are ~ssembled
for and evaluated by knowledtgeable customers for the
attriblltes rather than fqr the 1)eneflts. The activities atI
the end of the Strategic R&D phase 9f product
development also remarks the end of ttchnology
,
dominated phase and signifies the beginning of market
1
driven philosophy; of product development.
The remaining phases of product development
more o~ less cortespond to the later half of the
Embryonic PhasQ of the tbchnology life 'cycle. TheI
R&D activities in tHis phase relate to Shorl Term R&D
which is defined as the process of exploitation ofI
new techniques/technologies to de~ign products that
are practical, reliable and manufacturable! The focus
now shifts to product design, prototype/pilot plant
operations, and product evaluation/testing, that is, to all
" I
elements of activities required to demonstrate the
capab\lity of the'product and the integrity of the design
sp.ecification during manufacture.
Short- Term R&D activiti~s related to the product
are best carried out ,at the industry which is market
or;iented. The R&D emphasis at the end of the
Expansion Phase shifts from product development to
1 "
process R&D. WIth the emergence of the dominant
design, industry woul~ I also have achieved the
standardisation spught by the customers. The Maturity
Phase and the Ageing Phase c!>f the life cycle will now
I
follow. 1
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c.onsiderable op~ortunities to fombine multiple
technologies in a modular configuration so that the
designers and planners have scope to take aQvantage of
progressive improvements in the constituent
technologies for commercialisation. Technology fusion
is particularly suited for providing competitive
advantage for products of consumer electronics as well
as for industrial products. Since the search has to be
carried out in core as well as peripheral technologies
ahead of actual product realisation, the costs of search
in technology fusion are likely to go up as more and
more peripheral technologies are included for study and
analysis. Further, as it is not possible even for a large
industrial enterprise to create and maintain expertise in
all the peripheral technological fields that may be of
interest to sustain competitive advantage, technology
acquisition appears to be a viable alternative. A
combination j of global alliances, technological
consortia, contract R&D, joint research, .joint venturesI
and licensing with those who have the required
expertise in peripheral technologies would lead to the
lowering of the R&D costs.
,
9. .TECHNOLOGY FUSION
Technology fusion is considered to be a nonlinear
process because incremental technical improvements
from peripheral fields (with respect to an existing
product) of technology are blended to create products
that revolutionise markets and therefore create the same
impact on economic growth as 'the radical innovation
but without its structural shocks. In this case, the
perceived new market is the driving force. The primary
risk for the technolpgy manager is the selection of the
right technologies on which to base a product to fill an
identified customer need from a "..ide range of possible
alternatives. The R&D managqr converts the vague
needs and wants of the market based on basic customer
values into specific R&D projects well ahead and
resolves correctly the dilemma of what technologies to
focus on. and where to look for them. The challenge is
in the application and packaging of existing
technologies to match the characteristics of the market
that is sought. The R&D activity is now market driven
and has to deal with such questions as th~ suitability of
fhe product features to the market, the superiority of the
product over the existing hardware/software, the new
functionality in the product and whether these will
provide the required competitivF edge, etc. Technology
fusion results in convergence of technologies some of
8. CURRENT TRENDS IN TECHNOLOGYI
MANi\G'EMENT
In the f~ce of increased competition, due to
shortened product life cycle and entry of more industrial
enterprises/fountries than ever before, there is a
widespread acknowled?-ementl that the present concepts
and methodology of teFhnology management need to be
improved upon tb gain sustainable competitive
advantage. Technology as a coritpetitive weapon gave
rise to technology management which was translated in
the two decades after nineteenl fifti'es as management
and control of R&D id the form of project budgets, time
tables for completion and estimated returns on R&D
investment, etc. During the decade of the nineteen
eighties, the manag't1ment control paradigm was further
refined to evolve a strategic approach in which
technology was considered as a~ essential ;element of
strategy and was integrated into the strategic thinking
and planning process of the enterprise. It was found that
since this philosophy was adopted by a large percentage
of firms in a v,eryl short period, its impact as a
competitive ,advantage was diluted. It is now realised
that a technologically driven sustainable competitive
advant~ge depends not only on technology and its
integration with strategy ~u~ also on thel mode of
acquiJition arid later of deployment. Analysis of
companies with successful tr~lck record 'over a long
period brings dut that technolog'l acquisition should be
carried out preferably after ar~lysis of inputs from
different functional groups of ~he enterprise such as
markbting, manufacturing, engineering, R&D etc. This
adds ko complexity to technology acquisition since each
funct~onal group is I~kely td formulate and apply its own
criteria. The avail~bility of variety of methods for
technology acquisition and of several strategies for
techn'ology deployment add further complexity. In
effect, ! the industrial enterprise will have to turn into a
continuous lear~ng organisation to sustain the
competitive advant¥ge 17.
The question of tfchnology jacquisitlon as part of
the strate~y for competlitive advantage arises because of
the fact <hat radical in~ovations which provide an
unassaila~le advantage seldom dccur. ThF Japanese
have countered this uncertainty by technologyl fusion
which is t&e process of integration of diverse
established technologies into hy~rid technologies to
reap ecpnomic benefits I similar to that of a radical
innovationl8. The proliferation of several new generic
technologies over the last three decades, provides
t
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,
which were formerly peripheral to the commercial an'd
research activities of the firm. It brings them to the
centre stage and makes them as key elements of
CUJIlpelilive IIdvJIJllilgC. '11Iu!I, IIIC ({t\:t.O JJIlIllilgcr IIls~
has to ensure that the group develops expertise i~ a
broader array of technologies and scientific disciplines.
However, it is not always possible to grow expertise
in-house in an economically viable fashion and in time.
Therefore, the strategic framework of the enterprise
should incorporate technology acquisition and
deployment. Traditio~ally, the objective of technology
acquisition is to scan, shift and absorb technology
applications relevant to the mission of the organisation.
onc has to go Ibcyond this and assimilatc the
technology acquired from outside sources. Success in
I
technology assimilation will result in the transformation
of the enterprise into a 'continuously learning
organisation' .An exatnple of technology fusion R&D is
mechatronics, a term 'coined by Fanuc of Japan for new.
developments incorporating electronics in the field of
machine tools.
of compelilive advantage. (ii) it should transcejnd single
product lines and cpver a wide range of products, and
(iii) it is hard for c~mpetitors to imitate.
,
~or an R&D organisation, core competencies are
those co~e attributes which enable it t9 integrate
expertise from diverse disciplines, harnaonise the
know-how generated and acqttired and organise the
work to come up wit~ end prodbcts and services that (i)
are unanticipated by the competi~ors, (ii) invent and
shape consumer demands, and (iii) enter new markets
rapidly and successfully. ' I
In short, core competence should enable the R&D
institution to sustain competitivet advantage. Th'e core
competence view of the or~anisation must be
comprehensive and yet simple to cotnmunicate. The
success of the core conipetency based ente,'rprise
depends on the communication, involvement and 'a deep
commitment to working across functional and project
boundaries. It invol~es many levels of people and
,
provides opportuniti(!s to individuals with skills and
expertise f~r blendinF their functiona'l expertise with
those of others in new and interesting' ways. The core
competepcy management overc6mes thb restrictbd view
of end-products and fbcuses on the basic qustomer
vaiues that are perceived by the cu&tome~ in the
end-products. The customer values do not change as
fast as an end-product and the expertise to exploit such
customer values as low cost delsign, reliability, higher
productivity, take longer time to acfluire. Technology
deployment within the organisation should therefore
aim to enQance core competence and can manifest in the
form .of providing high value to customers, raise or
cl}ange technology standardsl offer a cluster of
technologies instead of a few, provide interrelatedI.
family of products, etc. I
,
The concepts of core competence, core products
and their link to ~nd products can best be illustrated by
the examples cited by Hamel' and Prahalad in their
book. Some exam~les oflcore competencies are
miniaturisation and video co""\petencies for Sony,
engines and power trainslfor Honda, network
management for AT&1l, fine optics miniaturisation and
mechatronics for Canon, user friendliness for Apple
,and display systems for Casio. Laser pril;1ter 'engines ,
for Canon, compressors for Matsushita,!and engines for
Honda, are some examples of core prod,uc'ts which have
given to each of the organisations a do'minant position
in the global market. The example of Ca~on which has
10. CORE COMPETENCE AS STRATEGIC
FRAMEWORK
The core competence view of the organisation is a
new strategic frame work proposed by Prahalad And
Hamel, linking technology to market and also for
enhancing the innovation capacity of the
organisation 19-22. It is a methodology that !is expected
to provide more than adequate rFturn on R&D
investments by spreading the cost over ~everal
end-product lines, an end-product being defined as a
revenue generating user/customer deliverable. Ik
exploits the features of design modularity and of
multiple technologies for end-products, It calls for a
shift of the long term focus as well as of the short term
emphasis from specific end-produ'cts to a set of
products to reap the benefits of potential synergies
between them. Of the many modules which configure
an,end-product there will be one or more in the form of
.,
component or a subassemblies which contribute
significant customer value to the end-product. These are
the core products and they are physical embodiment of
one or more core competencies.
Core competence is defined as a base skill or a
combination of base skills which should satisfy atleast
three simple criteria, namely, (i) it should be a source
188
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I
generated a wide variety of end-prodricts such as
.I
copiers. laser pridters, FAX, cameras and cam corders
from the co~e produclls namely the laser 'engine' and the
miniaturised motor provides a clue to the R&D
methodology ~sed in such organisations.
i
For example, the laser engine delivers a basic
value of de~kiop printing to the laser printer. The core
products are supported by the core competencies cited
earlier. W&ile e~ch end product is managed by aI
separate group for co~mercial exploitation, all of them
have the same undFrPinnings of shared core products
and core competencies. Aftelt a core product was
developed, Canon was able to pursue allied businesses,
namely, fax and persobal copiers. Asia result, Canon has
profited from the gai,ns of ecobomies of scale and an
~bility to turn out'new products faster than competition.
Further, witho.ut th~ embQdiment of the three core
competencies in the laser printer engine, continuous
improvements would have been difficult and the
company would not have been able to sustain long term
competitive advantage. ,
There are ~everal aspects of core competence that
have to be understood. Firstly, the demand for core
competencies is seldom uniform and varies widely with
core product cor'nbinations. Secondly, the range ofi
technical di~ciplines required for core competencies is
frequ~ntly extensive. Thirdly, the scope of activity
regarding core competence is 'often broad, raqging from
resea~ch, des~gn, system app\ication and operating
expertise. Fourthly, core compdtencies of.the technical
type can rarely be built instant~neously. Therefore the
number of core competenc\es tb be acquired or grown
within the or~anisation is a dJlicate balance between
redulction of the resources per core competency below
the ~ritical mass and leaving the enterprise vulnerable.
Sinde there are no clear g~idelines in the literature for
identifying clore fompetence and measuring their
effectiveness, the \nitial set of core competence will
havc to be refi~ed over a period of time by a process of
contipual learning and application to core product
development. One, type of assessment is bench marking
the level of expertlise of the organisation against that of
h .j
t e competItors. j I
Core compete~cies are not always strictly
technoldgy-based andl therefore, they are generallyi I
classifie~ into technology-based (1ntenna, technology),
nontechnology-based (defining end u~er Ivalues)
organisatiorl culture-based (qu~lity) and discipline-
based (system design) categories. \The technology-basedj
e strategic architecture outlining the
m in terms of existing competencies andI
acquired/develpped is accepted, it is
t the organisiltio"l take steps to protect,
reinforce the exi~ting core competencies
eir framework to identify core products.
ly, it is necessary tb monitor contingencies
Ice warning of adverse effects are made
response is triggered, within the strategic
is also necessary to foster a culture of free
uclil, human and information resources
)roject groups to maxi mise the return on
lied skills. The fostering of such a culture
because over a period of time it becomes
intrinsic motivation and behaviotrr
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core competency may be located in a single group
whereas organisation culture-based type may be
distributed throughout the organisation. The key
resource for success of the core competency
management is, bf course, the availability of talented
individuals. They should be selected on the basis of
their intimate knowledge of the activities of the
organisation, proficiency in the basic skills constituting
their core competency area, their desire to innovate and
their ability to operate within the matrixorganisation.
The implementation of core competency in an
organisation takes place by formulating a clear
articulate strategic goal. It is less precise with respect
to future end-products because it has to be sustained
over a period of time that covers several generations of
end-products. The strategic goal has to be overarching
so that the organisation has to stretch itself to reach it.
Some examples of strategic goals set by well known
I companies are, convergence of computers and
com~Qnications (NEC), imaging (Kodak), world class
copi~rs (Canon) and encirclement of Caterpillar
(Komatsu). j
Thel next step is the selection of core
competencies. This is carried out by a combined team
of functional specialists and the project staff whose
e?,perience, knowledge and understanding of the user
market is brought to bear upon the evolution of a
consensus on the basic skills and combination of basic
skills in respect of current and future end-products. The
same team will assess and evaluate the skills possessed
by the organisation and the existing core competencies
in terms of skills and those that are needed to be built
, or to be acquired by the organ\sation are clearly spelt
out.
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modification with sustained long term effect. The R&D
organisation would now be transformed into a cluster of
~ore competencies rather than a hierarchical structure
with project or matrix base. The core competency
management is distinctly superior to the present
structures of R&D organisation because the core
product acts as a balancing mechanism between the
long time frames of ~ore competence and the short time
needs of end-products.
II. INDIAN SCENARIO
By virtue of immediate past, R&D in India has
been confined mostly to governmental departme~ts
such as the CSIR~ DoS, DRDO, DAE, academicI
institutions und pub\ic scctor industrics. According t~
published data, the national R&D investment for the
year 1990-91 was Rs 4186 crore which works out to be
0.89 per cent of the gross national product. Of the total
national investment in R&D, over 30 per cent of it is
allocated to the DRDO, DoS & DAE from which the
spin-off in the commercial sector would be marginal.
Even though 87 per cent of the 1361 industrial 'RJ&D
units are in the private sector, their investment does not
amount to more than 12.6 per cent of the national total.
The average investment per R&D unit by the private
sector works out to be 0.65 crore whereas it is Rs 3.35
crore for the public sector whose R&t> units are larger.I
In terms of sales turn over (STO), the R&D investment
by the private sector works out to be 0.66 per cent. For
the year 1992-93, the R&D expenditure as part of tHe
STO was 0.57 per cent whereas it was 0.6 per cent for
advertising and 6.44 per cent for new plant and
machinery. The statistics clearly bring out that industry
in India has by and large accorded lowest priority to
R&D activities.
Until now, the funding for Exploratory R&D
acttVlttes has come from the Government of India. As
the returns on such investments are not directly
measurable, commercial enterprises will not be
interested in providing financial support. Even in the
US, contrary to what national ideology and public
rhetoric would lead us to believe, the US government
has supported and more importantly influenced the
direction and growth of technology in generating the
'generic knowledge'. This support served as a solid
substratum for technological innovations and
development by the industrial enterprises. Integrated
circuits and computer networking ~re two of the most
well known examples23. The governme~t of India wi
have to ~ontinue ,0 be the major contribu~r of funds
for scientific research and E~ploratory R&I? activities.
Even though in India, thejgoverninent has recently
taken measures to provide incentres to the industries
to invest in R&D activities at academic institutions by
I
granting 125 per cent tax write-off, it is not expected
that this will spur the Indian industrialists to rhake use
of this measure and build closer links with the aaademic
institutions. To day, by and large research activity in
advanced academic institutions ~has followed its own
pattern usually with little relevance to the demand~ for
solutions to the country's Deeds of tech~ology
dcvclopmcnt. The academic scientist p,llIces the ,rcntest
strategic value on th~ development and maintenance of
state-of-the-art internal capability in scientificlI
technical fields which have global importance, because
.
these are p'resumed to provide the ultirpate assurance of
new intellectual °l1portunities and, challen~es. By
contras\, the industr}1 reflecting a more traditional
approach looks to markets a.\' a more obvious ~nd direct
source of business opportunity. The differences between
I
the academic scientist and the industry manag~r are not
,
only In terms of the sources of: future plans but also in
time scales.
A secorid aspect which also may prevent .closer
interactio,n, arises as a result of replacing the traditional
pipel.ine' model, which is a sequential conceptual
framework for the innovation p{ocess from invention,
innovation to product development 1;Jy the interactive
,
model. It considers innovation ~s an integrated process
I
from the time an idea is confeived till the time the
product is intro4uced into the market. The innovation
process is described in terI11s of three main functional
areas, namely, re~earch (basic and exploratory),
technical (development, engineering, production) and
commercial(marketlng, s~les, distrib~tion and
services). One of the 'best examples of this model is
,
Xerography in which there was 'constant interaction
..,
between marketing, research and tech"ical functions to
reach the present level from the basiG invention of
Chester Carlson24. "
Strategic R&D activities leading towards specific
,
application or applications are' bes.t attempted in the
chain of laboratories set up by th~ central .government
under various ministries, and' in some industry
sponsored cooperative R&D institutions. Here again,
f
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,
I only the knowledge of the current and immediate future
needs but also ability to detect the latent and
unsuspected market needs that mjly arise out of changes
in economic status, political and social developments.
I
With these inputs both R&D and the industry will have
to draw their plans for Strategic R&D activities.
As far as Short- Term R&D is concerned, in the
case of mission-orient~d departments, these activities
are carried out by the institutions involved in Strategic
R&D. These include product design, hardware/software
realisation, product evaluation and testing so that the
capability of the product is proved and the integrity of
the design specifications during manufacture is assured.
Except for a handful of industrial houses, there are
no other industrial R&D groups which can take up
Short- Term R&D activities in our country today.
This is one of the main reasons why the results of
R&D from the government laboratories do not find their
way in the industries which resort to import of
technology from abroad. These capabilities have to be
built in-house by the large industrial enterprises, and for
small and medium industrial houses the German pattern
of industry association research laboratories would be a
better bet.
I.
There hasJ to be a shift in emphasis in the R&D
laboratories from individual projects to a set of projects
to reap the benefits of possible synergies that can be
developed over different functional and project groups.
The R&D laboratories would be required to reorganise
b~ having an overlay of the three groups, namely, core
competency, core product and end-product. They have.
to closely interact with each other for meeting the
organisation goals, with each group having the
autonomy through authority and resources to pursue
their own development goals within the broad envelope
of the strategic goals. In actual practice, there has to be
a continual tra~eoff of resource allocations between end
Iproducts, core products and core competence based on
the consideration that core competencies selected to
attain the strategicl goals of the organisation provide
the most salient guide postsl for the selection and
development of new core and enld-products.
\ I
the fundiilg today of projects at these institutions will
have to be by the gove~ment. In the case of the mission
ofiented departments such as the DRDO, DAE and DoS,
projects are initiated in close association with'users who
I
are knowledgeabl,e about their fu:ture requirements. The
Strategic ,R&D 'activities are aimed ultimately to
I
develop compone,nts/subsystems, systems and
processes ,!,ith technology as the main differentiator.
One of the main reasons for the success of the
"
mission-ori~nted government laboratories is an early
commitment I>y the user for possible utilisation. Such a
commitment in the commercial sector requires to be
encouraged'. if the ,capabilities of the government R&DI
laboratories are to be full}! exploited for building
I
competitiveness by o~r industries.
There are sevetal possibilities of linkages between
R&D laboratories and industry ~nd these can be listed
in the order of incre~sirig interaction and involvement
by the R&D as follows25. I I
I
(a) providing s~cialised analytical facilities including
specialised.labora~ory .farilities to the industry ,
(b) making available to the industry the specialised
,
trouble-shooting capabilities,
(c) development of alternate raw ,materials, ;
(d) development of analytical and quality control methodsI ,
for s~cific products/processes,
(e) specialised testing of plant, equipment and machinery ,
(f) design and development of special software for process
c~ntrol and production, .
I(g) gesign of process ~uipment,1 I
(h) development and fabrication/of product,prototypes,
~
(i) process kdesign for updati..on and better efficiency ,
and I
I
(j) ( pilot plant scaling up of labo'ratoIY processes.
IWhile some of these are already being exploited,j ,
there is ample scope to ~nlarge these activities. To
ensure greater kucc~ss for such liaisons, there is a need
to establish an interface between the government R&D
labo~alory and marketing groups of the industry to carry
out th~ functions of forecasting, evaluation and for
providing strategIc planning data about the likely
t:Ustui1I~r pr~f~r~~lt:~s, t~t:lInologjcul uptiulls UI1J
production changes. T~is is veryjcrucial 10 the success
of tile CClIIlpClilivCllCNNlclf 1Iic ill(IIINIry IIN it illVCllvl'N IICII
.,
12 CONCLUSIONS
.I
Technology mnnngement in ollr country is still in
il~ infancy. Our industries as well as the R&D
organisations have to understand the changing nnlure of
Irrllll(II(It!Y llllllllIgl'lllrlll II1111 tllc l'lllllplcxllicN ur tllc
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intense competitive epvironment. Since the technology
and the product life cycles are shrinking, and the
sustainability of ~ornpetitiveness has assumed
importance, the new6r concepts of technology fusion
and core competence framework for strategy requires a
closer interaction between the' scientists and the
managers of industry. Indian industry can no longer
remain indifferent tO4 R&D if it has t9 compete with
foreign companies for a share of the international and .
the domestic market. The State also has a positive and
definitive part to play in bringing the industry and R&D
together to gain and sustain the competitive edge.
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